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Some  progress  has  been  made  but  the  problem  remains  unsettled.  Recent 
developments, however, seem to point in the right direction. 
Introduction 
Prime  Minister  Stephen  Harper’s  Conservative  government,  in  early  2007,  faced  with  a 
politically mischievous draft Resolution by  the Quebec Bloc Québécois  in  the  federal House of 
Commons, seeking a vote to declare Quebec as a “Nation,” grasped the political nettle with his 










the 1960 Quebec Provincial elections, offered  to  federal  and Provincial political  leaders  in  the 
rest of Canada the beginning of a new era in Quebec politics.  The election as Premier of a new 
Quebec  Provincial  Liberal  government,  Jean  Lesage,  who  immediately  assembled  a  brilliant 
équipe de tonnere, including strong, disparate personalities like René Levesque and Eric Kierans 
as Ministers,  indicated the possibilities of a significant change of direction and new policies.    It 
was at this same time that that profound movement of thinking among Quebec intellectuals and 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leaders of opinion outside  the  formal party political processes  (Claude Ryan,  the Editor of  the 
influential  daily,  Le  Devoir  among  the  most  prominent  of  these)  that  came  to  be  called  the 
“Quiet Revolution,” with  its  challenge  to  the  traditional,  conservative,  rural‐oriented values of 
Quebec  society  and  the  close  links  between  church  and  state,  first  came  to  the  attention  of 
Anglo‐Canadian  political  elites  with  its  implications  for  the  future  of  the  Canadian  federal 
constitutional  system  and  Quebec’s  place  in  it.    The  first  reactions  to  the  Quiet  Revolution, 
outside  Quebec,  were  generally  ones  of  surprise,  with  the  somewhat  puzzled  or  plaintive 
response:  What  does  Quebec  want?    This  had  provided  the  occasion,  in  1962,  for  a  special 
conference called by the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law, with the keynote speaker Mr. 
Justice Ivan Rand who, in cases coming before the Supreme Court of Canada from Quebec over 
the  preceding  decade  and  more  and  involving  conflicts  between  Quebec  state  and  church 








in Quebec, were attempting  to  spell  out  some  form of  concrete agenda  for  change  in  federal 
governmental structures and the constitutional system at  large  in response to the  imperatives 
for  change,  as  they  saw  them,  of  the  Quiet  Revolution.    To  the  basic  questionWhat  does 
Quebec want?,  Professor  Jacques‐Yvan Morin who,  later, would  be  elected  to  the Assemblée 
Nationale  of Quebec and become Leader of  the Opposition and  then Deputy Premier  in René 
Levesqué’s  Parti  québécois  government,  would  suggest,  politely,  that  the  mere  fact  of  his 
interlocutors  from  English‐speaking  Canada  having  to  raise  the  question  indicated  their  own 




while  they  are  still  timely,  and before  a  situation becomes pathological  and politically  out‐of‐
hand.    The  major  criticism  that  would  emerge  thereafter  in  relation  to  responses  from  the 
English‐speaking  Provinces  and  from  the  federal  forces  in  Ottawa  to  the  challenge  of  change 
raised  by  the Quiet  Revolution, was  that, while well‐meaning  and  no  doubt well‐intentioned, 
there  was  always  a  certain  time  lag  between  formulation  of  Quebec  proposals  and  their 
perception  and  eventual  acceptance  in  English‐speaking  Canada:  an  example  perhaps  of  too 
little  or  too  late.    Over  the  course  of  the  next  several  decades  from  1960  on,  Quebec 
“demands,”  under  still‐federalist  Quebec  Premiers  of  Liberal  and  then  Union  Nationale  and 
finally  Liberal  once  more  party  affililations,  would  advance  from  acceptance  of  a  “special” 
constitutional  status  for  Quebec  within  the  federal  system  (reflecting  the  “French  fact”  in 
culture and  language  in Quebec),  later  to be  re‐styled, more euphemistically, as a “particular” 
status;  on  to  Daniel  Johnson  Sr.’s  rather  more  rhetorical  formulation  of  “Egalité  ou 
Indépendence”; and culminate, with the election of René Levesque’s  Parti québécois in 1976, to 
the carefully devised and ingeniously formulated “sovereignty‐association” proposal that would 
become  the  core  proposition  in  Premier  Levesque’s  Quebec  Provincial  referendum  on 
separation from Canada, in May, 1980. 




The  present  author,  looking  back  at  the  end  of  the  1970s  in  the  run‐up  of  that  first  Quebec 
referendum campaign,  had offered  the  suggestion  then  that  relatively modest  changes  in  the 
Canadian  federal  system,  offered  while  good  federalists  like  Premiers  Jean  Lesage,  Daniel 
Johnson,  Sr.,  Jean‐Jacques  Bertrand,  and  Robert  Bourassa  were  in  office,  and  directed  to 
pragmatic  governmental  accommodations  on  specific  problem‐situations  or  tension‐issues 
might  have  been  sufficient  to  channel  the  flow  of  ideas  for  change  emerging  from  the Quiet 
Revolution into pan‐Canadian, cooperative, joint federal‐and‐ provincial programmes for reform 
and  modernization  and  ultimate  renewal  of  antique  federal  constitutional  structures  and 
processes inherited from 1867. Canada, with the World’s third oldest written constitution, had, 
unlike the United States and Switzerland, experienced little in the way of serious and sustained 
attempts  at  substantive  review,  and  consequent  substantive  change,  since  the  Constitution’s 
first adoption.   
There had  indeed been  some positive  responses,  in  federal Ottawa and  in one at  least of  the 
Provinces,  Ontario,  during  this  period  of  the  first  two  decades  of  the  Quiet  Revolution.  If 
followed up energetically,  these  initiatives might have  led  in  the direction  to a programme of 
pragmatic change. Prime Minister Pearson, in his two minority governments (1963‐5 and 1965‐
8),  used  his  own  considerable  professional  experience  and  background  in  patient  diplomatic 
negotiation,  to  introduce  a  politic  of  “cooperative  federalism”  in  federal‐Quebec  and  federal‐
Provincial  relations  generally.    Pearson’s  Cooperative  Federalism  was  exercised  as  a  form  of 
executive  federalism,  without  formal  constitutional  amendments  and  on  a  necessarily 
piecemeal,  step‐by‐step  basis.    Out  of  this  conscious  federal  politic  emerged  Ottawa‐Quebec 
special agreements and formal understandings on concrete practice as to Quebec government 
representation  in and active participation as part of  the Canadian delegations  to  international 
conferences  and  international  organizations  touching  on  the  French  fact  in  its  cultural  and 
linguistic exercise.  The practical opening to a Quebec rôle in Canadian foreign policy‐formation 
in  international  agencies  like  UNESCO, was  actively  sponsored  by  Pearson’s  Foreign Minister, 
Paul  Martin,  Sr.,  with  a  welcome  quiet  support  and  understanding  on  the  part  of  Ontario 
Premier  John  Robarts.    It  stands  as  an  example  of  an  empirical  approach  to  the  issue  of  a 
“special”  or  “particular”  rôle  for  Quebec,  but  on  a  deliberately  non‐rhetorical  basis  in 
circumstances where pragmatic  judgment and common‐sense clearly demonstrated  its mutual 
benefit and practical utility in federal and Quebec terms.  These de facto accommodations of the 
1960s  anticipated  by  some  four  decades  the  latter‐day  debate  about  providing  just  such  a 
bilateral,  federal‐Quebec  special  constitutional  arrangement  as  to  a  Quebec  rôle  in  foreign 
relations,an  issue raised and debated  in Ottawa  in 2006‐7,  incidentally without either party, 
Ottawa  or  Quebec,  seemingly  being  aware  of  the  earlier,  Pearson/Martin  practical 
arrangements made  with  Quebec  Provincial  Liberal  and Union  Nationale  governments  in  the 
1960s.   
Other,  similar  federal  initiatives  were  not  too  forthcoming  at  the  time,  probably  because  of 
federal  government  preoccupation  with  those  oldest,  continuing,  permanent  constitutional 
filesinvolving  the  search  for  new,  all‐Canadian,  autonomous,  self‐operating  machinery  for 









bring  the  files  to  successful  completion  at  long  last  and  almost  succeeded politically with  the 
federal‐Provincial Victoria Accord of 1971, it may be suggested that deciding what one wants to 
put into a constitutional charter is more readily capable of generating public support for change 
than  the necessarily  dry,  textually‐based discussion,  continued ad  infinitum, on  the  amending 
machinery itself.  This, ultimately still‐born federal initiative of 1971 and also the federal Official 
Languages Act  of  1970,  establishing  French  and  English  official  bilingualism within  the  federal 
government and its services, hardly unexpectedly were not enough to stave off the rising tide of 
political  disillusionment  or  disaffection  within  Quebec  as  to  the  progress  of  change  to  the 
federal  system.    It  was  not  until  the  shock  of  the  electoral  defeat  of  the  Bourassa  Provincial 
Liberal  government  in  1976  and  its  replacement  by  the  Levesque  pro‐separatist  government 
that  the  Trudeau  federal  government  began  its  own  approach  to  preparing  a  comprehensive 
programme  for  substantive,  institutional  and  processual  change  in  the  federal  constitutional 
system.  But  it  was  then  very  late  in  the  day,  and  it  all  ended,  inconclusively,  with  Trudeau’s 
defeat  in  the  federal  general  elections  of  1979,  about  the  same  time  as  the  launching  of 
Quebec’s own Provincial “sovereignty‐association” referendum vote. 
Reference has been made already to the positive contribution of Ontario Provincial Conservative 
Premier,  John  Robarts,  to  the  development  of  a  politic  of  pragmatic  accommodation  for 
Quebec’s  “particularistic”  constitutional proposals  in  concrete problem‐situations where  those 
proposals  could be  accepted,  empirically,  as  reasonable  in  relation  to  the  federal  system as  a 
whole.    Robarts’  term  as  Premier  of  Ontario  began  soon  after  Lesage’s  election  in  Quebec.  
Robarts, who would go on to support Prime Minister Pearson’s adoption of the new Canadian 
(Maple  Leaf)  flag,  in  spite  of  opposition  from  within  Robarts’  own  Provincial  Conservatives 
organization, quietly moved to establish a close working relation between Ontario and Quebec.  
This  effective  entente  cordiale  between  the  two  Provinces  led  Robarts  to  establish  a  non‐
partisan  Advisory  Committee  on  Confederation  and  its  renewal,  drawing  on  expert  talent  as 
diverse  as  Donald  Creighton,  Eugene  Forsey,  Alexander  Brady,  Tom  Symons,  Ian MacDonald, 
John Meisel, and Bora Laskin, to advise him on the renewal of the federal system.  Robarts also 
introduced his own pro‐active policies as to French  language education  in Ontario schools and 
on  rights  of  franco‐Ontarians.    His  advisors  published  two  volumes  of  their  studies  and 
recommendations  on  constitutional  change.  These  were  perhaps  the  most  impressive  and 
detailed  collection  of  federal  constitutional  papers,  federal  or  Provincial,  of  this  period,  with 
their  openings  to  step‐by‐step,  incremental  programmes  of  constitutional  change,  including 
acceptance of Quebec claims for “special” or “particular” constitutional provisions which could 
also be opened  to other Provinces  than Quebec  if desired.   Robarts would  later be  invited by 
Prime Minister Trudeau  to co‐chair, with  federal  Liberal Minister,  Jean‐Luc Pepin  in 1978‐9,  in 
the  last  federal  response  to  the  approaching  Quebec  Provincial  referendum  on  separation,  a 
special  federal  consitutional  Task  Force  which  would  devise  the  new,  in  Canadian  terms, 
constitutional concept of “assymetrical federalism”particular or distinct, special constitutional 
provisions  and  powers  for  different  member‐states  or  Provinces,  according  to  demonstrated 
special conditions or special needs in each case.  The defeat of the Trudeau government in the 




constitutional  amending  machinery,  and  finally  also  the  politically  rather  more  controversial 




constitutional  Charter  of  Rights,  and  Freedoms.  The  Trudeau  constitutional  package  did  not 
include assymetrical federalism as a new governing principle for constitutional change. 
One  of  the  politically more  curious  aspects  of  the Quiet  Revolution’s  impact  in  constitutional 
change  in Quebec  concerns  Prime Minister  Trudeau’s  own  rôle  in  the  great  debate,  over  the 
years since 1960, between the successive governments of Quebec on the one hand and federal 
Ottawa.    The  options  as  to  change  to  the  constitution  were  historically  constrained  by  the 
continuing  centralization  of  political  and  economic  power  in  the  federal  government  and  the 
marked  accretion  to  the  federal  government  in  the  supporting  constitutional  law‐making 
powers and processes necessary for that.  In its early post‐1867 period, as applied in London by 
the  Privy  Council,  (the  highest  appellate  jurisdiction  for  the  British  colonial  Empire  overseas, 




the  onset  of  the  World  Economic  Depression  at  the  end  of  the  1920s,  and  by  the  rise  of 
Keynesian economics, the federal government came to be viewed by planners and technocrats 
as the most favourable arena for implementation of their ideas.  Keynesian economics resulted, 
as  law‐in‐action,  more  or  less  inevitably,  in  a  highly  centralized  Keynesian  constitution.    The 
intellectual climate in the Universities and academies in English‐speaking Canada was generally 
centripetally  oriented,  and  this  among  a  widely  diverse  group  of  personalities:  W.  P.  M. 
Kennedy, Vincent MacDonald, Frank Scott, Raphael Tuck, and the young Bora Laskin, as prime 
examples.    It would  take a very strong group of Provincial Premiers  to counter  this, and apart 
from Robarts in Ontario and his successive Quebec counterparts, the Provincial Premiers did not 
have the constitutionally sophisticated advice readily available to them to counter federal power 
effectively.    It  was  always  apparent  that  special  concessions  or  accommodations  of  a 
constitutional  nature  for  Quebec  in  Canadian  federalism  would  either  have  to  come  from 
recognition  and  acceptance,  de  facto  if  not  de  jure,  or  “special”  or  “particular”  or  “distinct” 
status  for  Quebec  by  itself;  or  else  through  some,  by  now  generalised,  comprehensive 
redistribution and relocation or decentralization of effective power, including fiscal and tax and 
revenue  powers,  in  favour  of  all  of  the  Provinces  together  at  the  expense  of  the  federal 
government.    Prime Minister  Trudeau,  of  a  slightly  older  generation  of Quebec  thinkers  than 
those who led the Quiet Revolution, had, as demonstrated by Max and Monique Nemni in their 











the  Province  of Quebec would  constitutionally  apply  “territoriality”  of  the  French  language  in 
Quebec  in  terms  of  Quebec’s  own  jurisdiction  and  law‐making  reach,  provided  Quebec  also 
guaranteed  English‐speaking minority  rights  in  the  Province.    The  Provincial  laws  would  thus 





Official  Languages  throughout  Canada  within  the  reach  of  federal  institutions  and  federal 
powers.    By  the  same  token,  criticisms  of  Trudeau’s  belated,  after‐the‐event  reaction  to  the 
Quebec Provincial Sovereignty‐Association referendum of May, 1980, and to the clear majority 
rejection  of  the  referendum  proposal  by  Quebec  votersTrudeau’s  compromise  three‐part 
Constitutional  “patriation”  project,  and  the  failure  of  his  original,  more  grand  design  of  a 
wholesale  revision  and modernization  of  federal  constitutional  institutions  and  processes,  do 
not  perhaps  fully  recognise  the  disabling  concessions  Trudeau  had  felt  compelled  to make  to 
secure the grudging political support of the politically  intransigent   “Group of Eight” Provincial  




new act of Constituent power, and not,  in any case, a  response  to Quebec’s Quiet Revolution 
prime  imperatives,  was  felt  most  strongly  in  Quebec  itself  where  the  then  government  of 





Lake  Accord,  1987‐1990,  whose  proposals,  strongly  influenced  by  the  Pepin‐Robarts 









then  Opposition  M.P.(Reform  Party),  Stephen  Harper,  for  asserting  a  federal  legal  power  to 
control any ambiguous or deliberately misleading verbal formulation by the Quebec government 




after  the  referendum.    The  Clarity  Act  stands  thereby  as  an  example  of  trying  to  close  the 
barnyard  door  after  the  horse  had  already  bolted.    Prime  Minister  Trudeau  had  rejected  a 
similar  proposal  for  federal  Government  legal  intervention  against  the Quebec  Government’s 
Sovereignty‐Association  formula  as  put  forward  in  the  first  such Quebec  referendum of May, 









The  long  debate  will  undoubtedly  continue  over  how  to  accommodate,  within  the  federal 
system,  the best  aspirations of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution.   Mistakes were obviously made  in 
the past, or opportunities  for politically acceptable solutions not profited  from when the  time 
was ripe.  English‐speaking Canadians, federal and Provincial, took too long to comprehend the 
nature  and quality  of Quebec  “demands,”  or  to  accept  that  pragmatic  accommodations were 
possible, on a basis of mutuality and reciprocity of  interest, once the debate should be shifted 
from  the abstract, high‐level doctrinal  level  to  concrete,  empirically‐based problem‐situations.  
Prime Minister Mulroney dallied too long, when political success was within his grasp, after all 
the Provincial Premiers had signed on to the Meech Lake Accord text in 1987, in himself moving 
to  ensure  the  Accord  would  have  prompt  ratification  as  constitutional  amendment  by  the 




day  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Canada‐wide  public  euphoria  resulting  from  gratitude  for  the 
triumphant  pro‐federalist  vote  in  the  May,  1980,  Quebec  referendum,  in  the  evident  public 
willingness  to  support  fundamental  change.  Trudeau  waited  too  long  with  his  constitutional 
“patriation”  package  until  he  was  constrained,  finally,  to  accept  watered  down  compromises 
imposed by the “Group of Eight” Provincial Premiers as the price of their political acquiescence 
to the constitutional amendment that would become the Constitution Act of 1982.  Again, Prime 




in  the  second  Quebec  referendum,  suggests  the  dangers  of  immobilisme  and  absence  of 
imaginative initiatives when one holds all the political cards.  Finally, could not Quebec leaders, 
Union Nationale, Provincial Liberal, and Parti québécois, in their turn, have shown, (and this not 
merely  for  tactical political  reasons),  some greater generosity and  interest  in making common 




incapable  today  of  responding  to  imperatives  of  contemporary  democratic  constitutionalism?  
The unreformed, unelected Senate,  for example, has  long been a major point of grievance  for 
English‐speaking  Canada.    Surely,  even  Quebec  reformers,  whatever  their  political  affiliation, 
must have been startled at the characterization of the federal Senate, made by Supreme Court 
of Canada judges on an Advisory Opinion reference by the Trudeau Liberal Government in 1979, 




formulate  common  positions  and  strategies  for  constitutional  modernization  and  federal 
reform, is clearly a major advance, if belated, in the right direction at this time. 
